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Abstract
Popular content distribution is one of the key services provided by vehicular ad hoc networks
(VANETs), in which a popular file is broadcasted by roadside units (RSUs) to the on-board units
(OBUs) driving through a particular area. Due to fast speed and deep fading, some file packets might
be lost during the vehicle-to-roadside broadcasting stage. In this paper, we propose a peer-to-peer (P2P)
approach to allow the OBUs to exchange data and complement the missing packets. Specifically, we
introduce a coalitional graph game to model the cooperation among OBUs and propose a coalition
formation algorithm to implement the P2P approach. Moreover, cognitive radio is utilized for vehicle-
to-vehicle transmissions so that the P2P approach does not require additional bandwidth. Simulation
results show that the proposed approach performs better in various conditions, relative to the non-
cooperative approach, in which the OBUs share no information and simply response to any data request
from other OBUs.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have been envisioned to provide increased convenience
and efficiency to drivers, with numerous applications ranging from traffic safety, traffic efficiency
to infotainment [1], [2]. One particular type of downloading services has attracted a lot of
attentions for its applications in both safety-related and commercial areas. That is, the distribution
of popular multimedia contents to on-board units (OBUs) inside a geographical area of interest
(AoI) by roadside units (RSUs), which is referred to as popular content distribution (PCD) in [3].
Examples of PCD may include: a local hotel periodically broadcasts multimedia advertisements
to the vehicles entering the city on suburban highway; a local travel company advertising the
current activities in scenic areas to the passing vehicles; and a traffic authority delivers real-time
traffic information ahead, or disseminates an update version of local GPS map [3].
On the Internet, the downloading services of large files (e.g. high-definition movies) often adopt
peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols, such as BitTorrent and eDonkey2000 [4]. Those P2P systems go
beyond client-server systems by introducing symmetry ideas (a client may also be a server) and
enjoy high performances in data rate, delay, scalability, and robustness. For PCD in VANETs,
it is natural to adopt P2P ideas for improving the network performance. Actually, since it takes
usually less than 1 minute for moving vehicles to drive through the coverage of an RSU, the
OBUs may fail to download the large popular file (e.g. an advertisement video may be as
large as 100 MB) directly from RSUs within the limited time for vehicle-to-roadside (V2R)
transmissions. For completely downloading the popular file, it is not only optional, but also
essential for the OBUs to build a self-organizing decentralized P2P network, in which popular
packets are exchanged among OBUs through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) channels. However, those
P2P techniques on the Internet should be carefully inspected before applying in the proposed
PCD problem for the following reasons:
1) The wireless links in VANETs are unreliable due to both deep fading and co-channel
interference, compared to the wired links on the Internet.
2) The network topology of a VANET is unpredictable and ever-changing, due to the high
mobility of OBUs, compared to the static topology of the Internet.
Hence, P2P protocols in VANETs are no longer application level protocols based on reliable
transmissions, but cross-layer protocols that jointly considers content request, peer location,
3channel capacity, and potential interference.
In [5], the author first studied cooperative downloading services in VANETs, in which they
proposed SPAWN, a pull-based, P2P content downloading protocol that extends BitTorrent.
However, the peer and content selection mechanisms have high overhead and are not scalable,
especially when most of the vehicles are interested in downloading popular contents. In [3], [6],
network coding (NC) methods were proposed, in which packets are mixed together by coding
at every intermediate node and the broadcast nature of wireless medium is exploited, so that
the usefulness of each coded packet is increased. In [7], the author focused on the link layer,
and proposed VC-MAC, a cooperative medium access control (MAC) protocol for gateway
downloading scenarios in vehicular networks, to maximize the “broadcast throughput”.
In this paper, we propose a P2P approach to address the PCD problem in VANETs, in which
the OBUs are allowed to exchange data and complement their missing packets. Among all the
possible P2P solutions, the non-cooperative approach is simple to apply, in which the OBUs
share no information and response to any data request from other OBUs. However, since the
transmissions are not coordinated, the non-cooperative approach might be inefficient due to the
collisions and repeated transmissions. Therefore, we consider to introduce cooperation among
OBUs, i.e., the OBUs can share some information to make the P2P approach more efficient.
Particularly, we adopt the coalitional graph game model as first introduced by Myerson in [8]. In
a coalitional graph game, the players try to maximize their individual payoffs, which are related
to the specific graph that interconnects them. This model has recently been used in many graph-
based communication problems [9]. In [10], the author investigated the problem of the formation
of an uplink tree structure in the IEEE 802.16j standard with the coalitional graph game model,
in which the relay stations form a directed tree graph to improve their utility considering both
packet success rate and link maintenance cost. In [11], the author considered a network formation
game where the nodes wish to send traffic to each other and a form of the myopic best response
dynamics is proposed. In the proposed PCD problem, we introduce a coalitional graph game
model considering content request, peer location, channel capacity, and network topology, and a
coalition formation algorithm is proposed to implement the P2P approach based on this model.
Also, we utilize cognitive radio (CR) for V2V transmissions in the proposed approach. In
VANETs, V2V links might be blocked by the factors such as deep channel fadings and severe data
collisions. By exploiting CR, it is possible to utilize other available channels with better channel
4conditions, which in result, increases the sum transmission rate and reduces data collisions in the
network. Therefore, CR is better for QoS for delay sensitive applications. Moveover, the vehicles
can easily provide sufficient power and space that are especially needed by CR devices. And in
vehicular environments, especially in suburban highways, the spectrum is relatively clean and
there are plenty of spectrum holes that can by utilized by CR. Thus, CR is beneficial in VANETs.
Considering all the benefits, we utilize CR for the vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) transmissions in the
P2P approach.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a coalitional graph game model to the
popular content distribution problem in VANETs. Based on the game theory model, a distributed
coalition formation algorithm is proposed, in which the OBUs self-organize into coalitions to
coordinate their V2V and V2I transmissions. Simulation results show that, using the proposed
algorithm, the maximal total throughput is increased by 133% and 250%, respectively, relative to
the non-cooperative approach and the pure broadcasting scheme. And the total possessed packets
are increased by 25% and 218%, respectively, relative to the non-cooperative approach and the
pure broadcasting scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the system model and
the non-cooperative approach. In Section III, we formulate the graph-based utility function and
present a coalitional graph game for modeling the transmitting behaviors of OBUs. In Section
IV, we exposes the properties of the coalitional graph game as well as the dynamics algorithm
for forming a best-response network graph. In Section V simulation results and analysis are
presented, and in Section VI we conclude the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
Consider a VANET consisting of N OBUs driving through the coverage of a RSU. A popular
content, which has been equally divided into M packets with the size of each packet s, is
broadcasted at an authorized frequency band (e.g. the 75MHz bandwidth in the 5.9GHz band
for IEEE 802.11p [12]) from the RSU to the OBUs inside the coverage. We suppose the V2R
transmission time is not sufficient for any OBU to download the entire file, but a few packets.
Let N , M and Mi denote the set of OBUs, and the set of packets, and the set of packets
possessed by OBU i, respectively.
5For downloading of the entire file, a P2P network is built among OBUs by unauthorized
channels using cognitive radio. We suppose there are K such channels with primary traffic
modeled as K independent Poisson processes with the same arriving rate λ per time slot. In
each slot, every OBU in the network transmits, or not, to another OBU through an empty channel.
The OBUs keep exchanging their possessed packets until every OBU in the network achieves the
entire file, formally, Mi = M, ∀i ∈ N . Let K and Ki denote the set of unauthorized channels
and the set of unauthorized channels sensed by OBU i, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 1, the evolution of the popular file in an OBU is illustrated. When an OBU
arrives in the range of the RSU, it immediately receives the broadcasted packets from the RSU.
As getting out of range, it starts the P2P transmissions with other OBUs in unauthorized channels
using cognitive radio. After finite P2P transmissions, the popular content can be entirely obtained
by all OBUs in the network.
B. Channel Model
In this paper, we suppose all OBUs and the RSU are equipped with single omnidirectional
antenna. The RSU periodically broadcasts the popular file at an authorized frequency with data
rate R0. For the V2R channels between the RSU and the OBUs inside its coverage, we adopt
Rayleigh model for small-scale fading and a path loss model with the path loss exponent equal to
4. For simplicity without loss of generality, we do not consider the shadowing by other vehicles.
Also, we assume in the same slot the channel is unchanged. Thus, the gain of the V2R channel
between the RSU and any OBU i, denoted by hi, is given by
hi = αdi
−2, (1)
where α is a complex Gaussian random variable with unit variance and zero mean, and di is
the distance between the RSU and OBU i. Therefore, the capacity of the V2R channel between
the RSU and OBU i, denoted by ci, is given by
ci = W log2
(
1 + β |hi|
2
)
, (2)
where W is the bandwidth authorized for V2R communications and β a scale factor representing
the transmit power of the RSU. In each slot, we assume OBU i can receive useful data from
the RSU if and only if ci > R0.
6For the V2V channels, we suppose the transmitting signal from any OBU i can only be
received by its “neighbors” (the OBUs with a line of sight (LOS) to OBU i) [13], denoted by
Ni. For those channels with a LOS, we adopt a similar model as the V2R channels. Thus, the
channel gain hki,j between OBU i and OBU j 6= i in the k-th unauthorized channel is given by
hki,j =


αdi,j
−2, a LOS exists,
0 , otherwise,
(3)
where di,j is the distance between OBU i and OBU j, and k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Therefore, the
corresponding capacity, denoted by cki,j , is given by
cki,j = Wk log2
(
1 + βi
∣∣hki,j∣∣2
)
, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, (4)
where Wk is the bandwidth of the k-th channel, βi a scale factor representing the transmit power
at OBU i. For simplicity without loss of of generality, we assume W1 = W2 = . . . ,WK = W ′
and β1 = β2 = . . . , βK = β ′.
C. Non-cooperative Approach
In the non-cooperative manner, the P2P transmissions do not coordinate with each other. For
any OBU i ∈ N , its packet request is broadcasted to its “neighbors” at the beginning of each
slot, and the first responding OBU, e.g., OBU j, transmits the requested packets to OBU i. For
finding available channels, OBU j randomly senses Kj < K unauthorized channels, the set of
which is denoted by Kj ⊆ K, and for each channel with a constant time τ . If the period of a
slot is T , the transmitting time left is then T −Kjτ , and the corresponding rate is given by
Rkj,i =
(
T −Kjτ
T
)
ckj,i, k ∈ Kj . (5)
The channel with the largest transmission rate is selected by OBU j, which is given by
R∗j,i = max
k∈Kj
Rkj,i =
(
T −Kjτ
T
)
×max
k∈Kj
ckj,i. (6)
We suppose the relation between Kj and the maximum channel capacity c∗j,i can be given by
7a function f(Kj) in the average sense. The transmission rate in (6) is then rewritten as
R∗j,i =
(
T −Kjτ
T
)
f(Kj). (7)
To maximize R∗j,i, we have Kj must satisfy
dR∗j,i
dKj
= 0.⇒ Kj +
f(Kj)
f ′(Kj)
=
T
τ
. (8)
We further suppose f(Kj) = A ln (Kj + 1) and T = Kτ , then, (8) is rewritten as
(Kj + 1) ln (Kj + 1) +Kj = K. (9)
Equation (9) can be easily solved by numerical solutions and the result can be seen as a reference
value for Kj . We adopt a logarithmic form as the expression of f(Kj) for the following reasons:
(1) f(Kj) must be an increasing function, since an extra channel can only increase, or at least,
maintains the maximum capacity in average sense, (2) f(Kj) must be a concave function, since
the contribution of an extra channel will be mitigated by the increasing channel number.
In the above analysis, we do not consider any data collisions, which, however, are inevitable.
As we noted, the transmitting signal from any OBU i can only be received by its “neighbors”.
Thus, the signal as well as the interference are both confined in the “neighbors”. Considering
the potential collisions with primary users (the users with spectrum license) and other OBUs,
the successful transmitting conditions are: (1) a LOS exists between OBU i and OBU j, (2)
no primary traffic exists in the k-th channel, (3) no “neighbors” of OBU i transmit in the k-th
channel. In fact, the influence of collisions has been involved in factor A when we suppose
f(Kj) = A lnKj , which makes no difference in the result.
III. COALITIONAL GRAPH GAME MODEL
For the proposed PCD problem, we have provided a non-cooperative solution, in which the
sensing-throughput tradeoff has been locally optimized. However, due to the random establish-
ment of V2V links, the OBUs may be connected to inefficient “neighbors” or even with no
“neighbor” to be connected to. Thus, the entire network may suffer from low data throughput,
or equivalently, high transmission delay. In this section, we introduce a coalitional graph game
model to coordinate the V2V links between different OBUs and also the V2R links from the
8RSU to the OBUs. In this model, each OBU decides to connect to or be connected to other
OBUs in order to maximize its own utility that takes into account data throughput as well as link
maintaining cost. The result of the interactions among the OBUs is a directed graph G(V, E)
with V denoting the set of all nodes (the OBUs and the RSU) and E denoting the set of all edges
(V2V links and V2R links). For any i, j ∈ V , we say the link from i to j exists, if ei,j ∈ E .
A. Utility Function
For any OBU i ∈ N , we suppose positive utilities can be extracted from both the effective
packets received from and transmitted to other OBUs, which depends on the current links
associated with OBU i. Thus, the utility function is a graph-based function, which is denoted
by Ui(G). Due to the single antenna, the maximum number of connections from or to OBU
i is confined to 1, which implies the out-degree λouti and in-degree λini of node i in graph G
satisfying 0 ≤ λouti ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λini ≤ 1. Using the broadcasting channel, the RSU can connect to
as many OBUs as possible while no OBU can connect to it, which implies out-degree λoutRSU and
in-degree λinRSU of the RSU in graph G satisfying λoutRSU ≥ 0, λinRSU = 0.
The corresponding utility of the received packets, denoted by U ini (G), is assumed to be
proportional to the number of received packets, which is given by
U ini (G) =


γinPj,imin
(
R∗j,iT
s
, |(M\Mi) ∩Mj|
)
, λini = 1 & ej,i ∈ E ,
γin
ciT
s
, λini = 1 & eRSU,i ∈ E ,
0 , λini = 0,
(10)
where γin > 0 is a pricing factor and Pj,i is the probability of successful transmission from
OBU j to OBU i, the expression of which will be given in the following part of the section.
The corresponding utility of the transmitted packets, denoted by Uouti (G), is assumed to be
proportional to the number of transmitted packets, which is given by
Uouti (G) =


γoutPi,j min
(
R∗i,jT
s
, |(M\Mj) ∩Mi|
)
, λouti = 1 & ei,j ∈ E ,
0 , λouti = 0,
(11)
where γout > γin is a pricing factor and Pi,j is the probability of successful transmission from
OBU i to OBU j, the expression of which will be given in the following part of the section. The
9main driver behind the transmitting benefit is that the importance of the role of OBU i increases
if OBU i serves more OBUs, and, thus, its utility should increase.
When OBU i transmits or receives data, certain channels are occupied, which increases the
probability of data collisions. The cost of potential collisions is proportional to the number of
OBUs that has been interfered. For the link from OBU i, the interference is confined in OBU
i’s “neighbors” Ni. For the link from OBU j to OBU i, the interference is confined in OBU j’s
“neighbors” Nj . Thus, the cost function, denoted by Ci(λouti , λini ), is given by
Ci(λ
out
i , λ
in
i ) =


γcostλ
out
i |Ni|+ γcostλ
in
i |Nj | , λ
in
i = 1 & ej,i ∈ E ,
γcostλ
out
i |Ni| , otherwise,
(12)
where γcost > 0 is a pricing factor.
In summary, given a transmission graph G(V, E), the cost and benefit of OBU i ∈ N is
captured by the following utility function
Ui(G) = U
in
i (G) + U
out
i (G)− Ci(λ
out
i , λ
in
i ). (13)
B. Collisions
For any given unauthorized channel k ∈ K and any OBU i ∈ N , the probability of miss (i.e.,
probability of missing the detection of the primary traffic) and false alarm (i.e., probability of
the false detection of the primary traffic) are denoted by P im(k) and P if(k), respectively. For
simplicity without loss of generality, we suppose the sensing devices in all OBUs have the same
performance for any channels, which implies P im(k) = Pm, P if(k) = Pf , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K. As we
noted, the primary traffic in any channel k is modeled as a Poisson process with parameter λ.
Thus, the probability that no primary traffic occupies channel k is denoted by P0 = e−λ.
We consider the probability of successful transmission from OBU i to OBU j, denoted by
Pi,j . For a successful transmission, the link from OBU i to OBU j should not be interfered
by other OBUs, which implies that none of OBU j’s “neighbors” is transmitting at the same
channel. In the average sense, there are P0K channels available for V2V transmission and OBU
i occupies one of them. Thus, the probability that OBU j’s neighbors do not transmit at the
same channel is given by
P ai,j =
(
KP0 − 1
KP0
)|Ni|
. (14)
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We denote by H1 the hypothesis that the unauthorized channel is occupied by a primary user in
real, and H0 the alternative hypothesis. Also, we denote by H′1 the hypothesis that the sensing
result shows the unauthorized channel is occupied, and H′0 the alternative hypothesis. Thus, the
possibility that the empty decision of the unauthorized channel is correct can be expressed by:
P (H0|H
′
0) =
P (H0)P (H
′
0|H0)
P (H ′0|H0)P (H0) + P (H
′
0|H1)P (H1)
, (15)
where P (H0) = P0, P (H1) = 1 − P0, P (H ′0|H1) = Pm, and P (H ′0|H0) = 1 − Pf . Note that
(15) is also the probability that the transmission from OBU i to OBU j does not collide with
primary traffic, we rewrite this probability as
P bi,j =
P0(1− Pf)
P0(1− Pf) + (1− P0)Pm
. (16)
Thus, the probability of successful transmission from OBU i to OBU j is given by
Pi,j = P
a
i,jP
b
i,j =
(
KP0 − 1
KP0
)|Ni|( P0(1− Pf)
P0(1− Pf) + (1− P0)Pm
)
, (17)
which completes the expressions of U ini (G), Uouti (G) in (10), (11), respectively.
IV. NETWORK FORMATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a myopic dynamics algorithm for the coalitional graph game,
which results in a directed graph that coordinates the transmissions in the network. Myopic
dynamics refer to the property of the dynamics that at any given round, nodes update their
strategic decisions only to optimize their current utility, in contrast to dynamics that consider
some long-term objective [11]. We show that the proposed algorithm is distributed and localized
algorithm that results in a local Nash network, which adapts to the environmental changes.
A. Network Formation Algorithm
The proposed network formation algorithm is distributively carried out by each OBU in the
network. Given the transmission graph G(V, E), the available strategies any OBU i ∈ N are
classified as follows:
1) Offer OBU j 6= i a new link ei,j , if λouti = 0.
2) Break the link ei,k, if λouti = 1, ei,k ∈ E .
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3) Accept j’s (OBU j or the RSU) request for the link ej,i, if λini = 0.
4) Break the link ek,i, if λini = 1, ek,i ∈ E .
5) Combinations of item 1 ∼ 4.
Formally, denote (ai, bi) as the state of OBU i, where ai ∈ N ∪ {RSU} is the node that
transmits to OBU i (ai = i refers to λini = 0), and bi ∈ N is the OBU that OBU i transmits
to (bi = i refers to λouti = 0). Thus, the state space of OBU i is given by {(ai, bi) | ai ∈
N ∪ {RSU}, bi ∈ N}. By carefully inspecting the strategies listed above, we find that those
strategies correspond to their consequent states of OBU i. Thus, the strategy space Si is also
the state space of OBU i. Formally, denote Si = {(ai, bi) | ai ∈ N ∪ {RSU}, bi ∈ N} as the
strategy space of OBU i and si ∈ Si as the strategy of OBU i.
Note that the proposed algorithm focuses on maximizing the current utility Ui of OBU i,
some of the strategies in Si may be infeasible for reducing the utilities of corresponding OBUs.
For strategies that only involves in breaking down old links (e.g., item 2 and item 4), the utility
Ui of OBU i should be improved, or at least maintained the same. For strategies that involves
in forming new links (e.g., item 1 and item 3), both the utility Ui of OBU i and the utility Uj
of OBU j should be improved, or at least maintained the same. Thus, we give the following
definition.
Definition 1: A local strategy si = (ai′, bi′) ∈ Si is a feasible local strategy for OBU i ∈ N
with state (ai, bi), if and only if: (1) Ui(G′) ≥ Ui(G), (2) Uai′(G′) ≥ Uai′(G) for ai′ 6= i, ai′ 6=
ai, ai
′ ∈ N , (3) Ubi′(G′) ≥ Ubi′(G) for bi′ 6= i, bi′ 6= bi, where G(V, E) is the current transmission
graph and G′(V, E ′) is the consequent transmission graph by strategy si. Denote Fi ⊆ Si as the
set of feasible strategies for OBU i.
Denote Gsi,s−i as the graph G formed when OBU i plays a feasible strategy si ∈ Fi while all
other OBUs maintain their vector of strategies s−i = [s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN ]. We define the
local best response as follows [15].
Definition 2: A feasible local strategy si ∈ Fi is a local best response for OBU i ∈ N if
Ui(Gs∗i ,s−i) ≥ Ui(Gsi,s−i), ∀si ∈ Fi. Thus, the local best response for OBU i is to select the
links that maximizes its utility given that the other OBUs maintain their vector of strategies.
We assume that each OBU is myopic, in the sense that the OBUs aim at improving their
utilities considering only the current state of the network. Several models for myopic dynamics
have been considered in the literature [15]–[17]. Here, we propose a myopic dynamics algorithm
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composed of indefinite number of rounds, where in each round all OBUs in N update their local
best responses by random priority. If the algorithm converges to a final graph G∗(V, E∗) after
finite rounds, we adopt G∗ to coordinate the transmissions in the network, that is, node i (OBU
i or the RSU) transmits to OBU j if and only if ei,j ∈ E∗.
B. Convergency and Stability
Having an analytical proof for the convergency of network formation games, especially with
practical utilities and discrete network formation strategies, is difficult [17], [18]. In fact, in
wireless applications [19]–[21], it is common to propose best-response algorithms without any
analytical proof of convergency, since such algorithms can, in most cases, converge.
If the proposed algorithm converges to a final graph G∗, we define the following concept [15]:
Definition 3: A network graph G, in which no node i can improve its utility by a unilateral
change in its feasible local strategy si ∈ Fi, is a local Nash network.
Lemma 1: The final graph G∗ resulting from the proposed algorithm is a local Nash network.
Proof: When the proposed algorithm converges to a final graph G∗(V, E∗), any strategy si
that OBU i ∈ N maintains must be the local best response s∗i . Thus, we have Ui(Gs∗i ,s−i) ≥
Ui(Gsi,s−i), ∀si ∈ Fi from the definition of local best response. In consequence, there is no OBU
i ∈ N can improve its utility by a unilateral change in its feasible local strategy si ∈ Fi. Hence,
the final graph G∗ is a local Nash network.
In the case of non-convergence, the proposed algorithm may cycle between a number of
networks. In order to avoid such undesirable cycles, one can introduce additional constraints
on the strategies such as allowing the nodes to select their strategies, not only based on the
current network, but also on the history of moves or strategies taken by the other nodes. In [22],
the author allows the nodes to observe the visited networks during the occurrence of network
formation. By setting up an upper bound for the occurrence number of a particular network,
those potential cycles could be broken and the proposed game can converge. This constraint need
every node be aware of the topology of the entire network, which is not a big problem in [22]
since the nodes are relay stations with fixed locations and high transmitting power. However, in
our scenario, where the nodes are OBUs with high mobility and limited transmitting power, it
is difficult for every OBU to achieve the entire topology within a slot-level period. Therefore,
in our proposed algorithm, we allow the OBUs to count for each used strategy and set an upper
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bound for it. Formally, we define a history function hti(si) which represents, for every used
strategy si ∈ Si (note the strategy space is now Si), the number of times this strategy was used
by OBU i in the past t iterations. Further, we define a threshold σ (positive integer) for hti(si)
above which OBU i is no longer interested in adopting this strategy, since it may lead to a cyclic
behavior. Thus, at any iteration t+ 1, there is an additional step for any OBU i ∈ N , which is
to update the set of its feasible strategies by
Fi
′ = Fi\{si | h
t
i(si) ≥ σ}, (18)
where Fi is the original set of feasible strategies defined in definition 1. The proposed algorithm
with strategy constraint is summarized in Table I.
By adding the strategy constraint to the algorithm, the coalitional graph game will converge
after finite iterations, which is guaranteed by the following theorem:
Theorem 1: Given any initial network graph G0, there exist a positive integer T , that the
proposed algorithm with strategy constraint will converge after T iterations.
Proof: Suppose the algorithm does not converge after T iterations. In this regard, denoting
by Gt the graph reached at the end of any iteration t, the proposed algorithm consists of a graph
sequence such as the following
G0 → G1 → G2 → . . .→ Gt → . . .→ GT . (19)
According to the pigeonhole principle, there exists a graph Gx(V, Ex) that occurs more than
T/ |G| times, where G = {G(V, E) | ∀i ∈ N , λini ≤ 1, λouti ≤ 1} denotes the set of all possible
network graphs. Again according to the pigeonhole principle, there exists an OBU x ∈ N that
uses the strategy sx = (ax, bx) more than T/(|G|N) times, where eax,x, ex,bx ∈ Ex. We suppose
T = |G|N(σ + 1). Then, after T iterations, there exits an OBU x ∈ N and one of its strategy
sx ∈ Sx, where the corresponding history function satisfying
hT (sx) >
T
N |G|
⇒ hT (sx) > σ, (20)
which contradicts to our constraint. Thus, the proposed algorithm with strategy constraint must
converge after T iterations, where T is a finite number.
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C. Scalability and Adaptation to Environmental Changes
The proposed algorithm in Table I adopts a distributed approach to form a network graph,
which coordinates all transmissions for the proposed PCD application. By carefully inspecting the
utility function Ui(G) in (13), we find that, for calculating Ui(G), the topology of transmission
graph G is not essential. All information OBU i needs can be achieved from OBU i’s “neighbors”
Ni, which includes channel conditions, the possessed packets of “neighbors”, the number of a
“neighbor’s neighbors”. Moreover, the strategy constraint we introduce can also be performed in
a localized manner. Hence, the proposed algorithm is a localized approach with overhead only
between “neighbors”, which is, therefore, a scalable algorithm.
In the proposed PCD problem, the myopic dynamics algorithm is repeated periodically every
slot, which allows the OBUs to take autonomous decisions to update the transmission topology
adapting to any environmental changes. As the slot is chosen to be shorter, the proposed algorithm
is played more often, allowing a better adaptability. Moreover, as the environmental changes
mitigate, we can expect the change of the final transmission graph also mitigates, which implies
less complexity in calculation since the transmission graph will be inherited by the next slot.
In the proposed algorithm, the OBU selects its transmitting channel individually without any
coordination, which may, when the network is dense, introduce considerable interference. To
avoid the potential collisions, interference management can be introduced, e.g., the cooperative
approach in [23], where each node assigns different weights on the channels and cooperatively
sort their channels, in a manner to reduce interference as much as possible. We do not introduce
such management for the following reasons:
1) The proposed PCD problem is in highway scenarios, where the spectrum is relatively clean
and the traffic flow is not heavy. Thus, the interference management may be unnecessary.
2) In order to implement the cooperative interference management, each node needs to share
its information with the entire network, which ruins the localized property of our algorithm.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the performance of the proposed algorithm in Table I is simulated in various
environmental conditions, compared with the pure broadcasting scheme, the non-cooperative
approach, and the optimal solution. Here, the pure broadcasting is a scheme in which no V2V
transmission is allowed and all the OBUs can only receive from the RSU. The pure broadcasting
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scheme can be seen as a lower bound for evaluating all possible P2P approaches. Also, we give an
upper bound with the optimal solution, in which the overall information has been considered and
an optimal solution has been derived by enumeration. The mobility model and system parameters
are presented in the following subsection.
A. Mobility Model and System Parameters
The mobility model we use is similar to the Freeway Mobility Model (FMM) proposed in [14],
which is well accepted for modeling the traffic in highway scenarios. In FFM, the simulation area
includes many multiple lane freeways without intersections. At the beginning of the simulation,
the vehicles are randomly placed in the lanes, and move at history-based speeds. The vehicles
randomly accelerate or decelerate with the security distance dmin > 0 maintained between two
subsequent vehicles in the same lane and no change of lanes is allowed.
In our scenario, the map has been simplified to a one-way traffic road with double lanes as
shown in Fig. 1. All the OBUs independently choose to speed up or slow down by probability
p and acceleration a > 0. The velocity of any OBU i ∈ N is limited by vmin ≤ vi(t) ≤ vmax
for all time. To better reflect the changing topology of VANETs, we decide to allow the change
of lanes when a vehicle is overtaking, as long as the security distance is maintained. Also, to
prevent the vehicles from being widely scattered, we also give an upper bound dmax for the
distance between any two subsequent vehicles in the same lane. The overall constraints in our
mobility model are listed as follows:
1) The OBUs are randomly placed on both lanes in an area with length L that is D away
form the RSU when the simulation begins.
2) The initial speed of OBU i ∈ N , denoted by vi(0), is randomly given in [vmin, vmax].
3) The speed of OBU i ∈ N satisfies:
vi(t+ 1) =


vi(t) , 1− 2p,
min (vi(t) + a, vmax), p,
max (vi(t)− a, vmin), p,
(21)
where p is the probability of acceleration or deceleration.
4) For any OBU i ∈ N with OBU j1 ahead in the same lane and OBU j2 ahead in the other
lane, OBU i switches to the other lane, if di,j1(t) ≤ dmin and di,j2(t) > dmin, or OBU i
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decelerates to vi(t+ 1) = vmin, if di,jk(t) ≤ dmin, k = 1, 2.
5) For any OBU i ∈ N with OBU j1 ahead in the same lane, OBU i accelerates to vi(t+1) =
vmax, if di,j1(t) ≥ dmax.
The parameters are taken from a general highway scenario as shown in Table II.
B. Simulation Results
In Fig. 2, we show the total throughput as a function of time for networks with N = 10, K =
10, and K ′ = 4. Let P (t) =
∑
i∈N |Mi| denote the total possessed packets in the network. Then,
the total throughput is given by dP (t)/dt, which represents the packets successfully delivered at
current slot t. For pure broadcasting scheme, the total throughput increases as the OBUs enter
the communication range of the RSU, and then decreases to zero as the OBUs leaves this area.
By introducing V2V transmissions as in the proposed approach as well as the non-cooperative
approach, the total throughput is largely increased. Even after the OBUs completely leaves the
RSU area, the packets can still be exchanged among the OBUs and the total throughput is still
above zero. Further, by introducing cooperation among OBUs, the proposed approach reduces
the probability of collision and avoids repeated transmissions, relative to the non-cooperative
approach, and thus, has a better performance in total throughput. In particular, Fig. 2 shows that,
using the proposed cooperative approach, the maximal total throughput is increased by 133% and
250, respectively, relative to the non-cooperative approach and pure broadcasting approach. Note
that as more packets are delivered in the network, the OBUs become less willing to exchange
data and the potential throughput for V2V transmissions decreases. The total throughput of
optimal solution may fall below other methods, and our proposed approach may fall below the
non-cooperative approach, especially seen from slot 50 to slot 100 in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 3, we show the sensing-throughput tradeoff by setting different K ′ from 1 to K in both
the non-cooperative approach and the proposed algorithm. As we can see, the value of K ′ with
the best performance occurs at K ′ = 4 ∼ 5, which coordinates to our reference value given in
(9). Thus, the best spectrum sensing time K ′τ can be individually decided by simple numerical
solutions. Note that even K ′ = K = 10, which means no time is left for V2V transmissions,
the OBUs can still receive data from the RSU. The total possessed packets P (t = 100) is above
zero for any K ′ ≤ K, as seen in Fig. 3.
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In Fig. 4, we show the performance of the proposed algorithm with different numbers of
cognitive radio channels for V2V transmissions. Here, the parameter K ′, representing the number
of sensed channels, has been chosen to satisfy equation (9). As we can see, the number of total
possessed packets is highly effected by the cognitive spectrum. Therefore, we can expect a
considerable performance improvement, when we apply CR for V2V transmissions, especially
in highway scenarios with plenty of spectrum holes.
In Fig. 5, we show the performance of the proposed algorithm with different network sizes.
Note that the total possessed packets increases linearly with the network size. We have the
average possessed packets of each OBU is a stable constant with different network sizes, which
implies the proposed algorithm is scalable and its performance is stable. This coordinates with
our analysis in Section IV.C, in which we point out that the overhead of the proposed approach
is localized. As seen in Fig. 5, when the network is large (N = 50), the total possessed packets
of the proposed cooperative approach are increased by 25% and 218%, respectively, relative to
the non-cooperative approach and the pure broadcasting approach. When the network becomes
smaller, the advantage declines gradually. In extremely sparse networks, as seen in Fig. 5 when
N converges to 1, there is few V2V transmission, so that all three P2P approaches degenerate
to the pure broadcasting scheme. Note that the centralized optimal solution is shown for up to
N = 10 since it is mathematically intractable for larger networks.
In Fig. 6, we show the convergence performance of the proposed approach for networks with
N = 5, 10, 15, K = 10 and K ′ = 4. In Section IV.B, we have proved the convergence of
the proposed algorithm. As we can see, the proposed approach converges in a fast speed with
different network sizes. Also, we can see the average possessed packets converge to different
values with different network sizes. On the one hand, denser networks have more chance for V2V
transmissions, and thus, brings more missing packets to the OBU after sufficient iterations of
our proposed algorithm. On the other hand, since there is a minimal distance constraint between
any two subsequent vehicles, the network can not be infinitely dense, and thus, the converging
value of average possessed packets can not be infinitely large. Actually, we can see that the gap
between N = 15 and N = 10 is considerably smaller than the gap between N = 5 and N = 10,
which stands for a limited converging value when N is infinite.
Also, if the iteration number is denoted by I , we have he overall complexity of the proposed
algorithm is O(NI). Since the proposed algorithm is distributed and the overall complexity is
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shared by all OBUs, the calculation complexity of each OBU is O(I), which increases linearly
with the iteration number. Thus, Fig. 6 also shows the performance of the proposed algorithm as
a function of the calculation complexity of each OBU, where the performance converges rapidly
to the maximal value as the individual calculation complexity increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have addressed the PCD problem in VANETs, in which the RSU broadcasts
a popular file to the passing OBUs, but the OBUs fail to receive some packets due to high speeds
and channel fadings. To support reliable transmissions, we have proposed a P2P approach based
on coalitional graph game to allow the OBUs to exchange data and complement the missing
packets. Specifically, we have introduced a coalitional graph game to model the OBUs, and have
proposed a coalition formation algorithm to implement the P2P approach. The convergence of
the proposed algorithm has been proved and the overhead has be localized for arbitrary network
sizes. Also, CR has been utilized to perform the P2P transmissions over unlicensed channels
and the sensing-throughput tradeoff has been analyzed, in which the optimal number of sensed
channels K ′ satisfies (K ′+1) ln (K ′ + 1)+K ′ = K, where K is the number of potential channels.
The simulation results show that, by introducing cooperation among OBUs in a coalitional graph
game model, the maximal total throughput is increased by 133% and 250%, relative to the non-
cooperative approach and the pure broadcasting scheme. Also, for networks in a large scale, the
total possessed packets of our proposed algorithm can be increased by 25% and 218%, relative
to the non-cooperative approach and the pure broadcasting scheme, respectively.
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TABLE I
PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR POPULAR CONTENT DISTRIBUTION IN COGNITIVE RADIO VANETS
Phase I: Spectrum Sensing
Each OBU i ∈ N randomly senses Ki unauthorized channels, the reference value of
which is given by (9).
Phase II: Network Formation
∗ repeat
In iteration t+1, given the current transmission graph Gt(V, E t) (In the first iteration,
G0 is the final transmission graph of the last slot), a randomly chosen OBU i ∈ N
engages in the algorithm as follows:
1) asks its “neighbors” in Ni for the needed information for calculation.
2) calculates the set of feasible strategies Fi defined in definition 1.
3) updates the set of feasible strategies by Fi′ as in (18).
4) chooses the local best response s∗i = (a∗i , b∗i ) defined in definition 2, and updates
ht+1(s∗i ) = h
t(s∗i ) + 1, h
t+1(si) = h
t(si), ∀si 6= s
∗
i .
5) the new graph Gt+1(V, E t+1) is updated by E t+1 = (E t\{eai,i, ei,bi})∪{ea∗i ,i, ei,b∗i },
where eai,i, ei,bi ∈ E t.
∗ until converges to a final graph GT after T iterations.
Phase III: Data Transmission
For any OBU i ∈ N with the set of available channels K∗i , OBU i
1) transmits to OBU b, if ei,b ∈ ET , b 6= i, through its best available channel k∗ ∈ K∗i ,
where Rk∗i,b = maxk∈K∗i R
k
i,b.
2) receives from a (OBU a, or the RSU), if ea,i ∈ ET , a 6= i, through a’s best
available channel k∗ ∈ K∗a, where Rk
∗
a,i = maxk∈K∗a R
k
a,i.
The algorithm is run repeatedly every slot for adapting to environmental changes.
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TABLE II
PARAMETERS FOR SIMULATION
N = 1 ∼ 50 number of OBUs in the network
L = 50m×N initial length of the fleet of vehicles
D = 350m initial distance from the RSU
vmin = 10m/s the minimal speed
vmax = 30m/s the maximal speed
dmin = 50m the security distance
dmax = 100m the maximum distance
a = 1 ∼ 5m/s2 the acceleration
p = 0.1 the probability of changing speed
M = 100 number of packets of the entire file
Ms = 100Mb the size of the entire popular file
K = 1 ∼ 10 number of V2V channels
K ′ = 1 ∼ K number of sensed V2V channels
W = 75MHz the bandwidth of the V2R channel
W ′ = 10MHz the bandwidth of V2V channels
β = 15dB signal-to-noise rate for V2R transmission
β ′ = 10dB signal-to-noise rate for V2V transmission
R0 = 5Mb/s the broadcasting rate of the RSU
γout = 0.5, γin = 1, γcost = 0.1 the pricing factors
Pm = 0.1 the possibility of missing
Pf = 0.1 the possibility of false alarm
Fig. 1. System model of popular content distribution in cognitive radio ad hoc VANETs.
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Fig. 2. Total throughput as a function of time for networks with N = 10, K = 10 and K′ = 4.
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Fig. 3. Total possessed packets by the proposed approach and the non-cooperative approach at slot t = 100, as a function of
K′ for networks with N = 10 and K = 10.
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Fig. 4. Total possessed packets by the proposed approach and the non-cooperative approach at slot t = 100, as a function of
K for networks with N = 10 and K′ satisfying equation 9.
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Fig. 5. Total possessed packets at slot t = 100, as a function of N for networks with K = 10 and K′ = 4.
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Fig. 6. Average possessed packets as a function of number of iterations by the proposed algorithm for networks with N =
5, 10, 15, K = 10 and K′ = 4.
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